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Abstract: Although several studies have analyzed the role that specific corporate governance
mechanisms have on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting practices, their findings have
not been conclusive and the evidence from developing countries is scarce. The theoretical support for
this relationship in the previous literature is found in Stakeholder, Agency, Legitimacy, and Good
Management theories. Undoubtedly, as the institutional environment has an important impact on
CSR reporting practices, it would be relevant for this field of research to analyze this relationship
in companies from emerging countries. It is suggested for the sake of convenience to consider
different levels of corporate governance mechanisms together due to the high interdependence
among them. Consequently, the aim of this paper is to analyze whether different levels of corporate
governance mechanisms (at the institutional, group, and firm level) are determinant factors of the
CSR reporting practices in BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The final
sample was composed of 281 companies. On the basis of our results, we conclude that institutional
corporate governance mechanisms influence the company’s CSR reporting strategy and that both
CSR disclosure practices analyzed are affected by group-level corporate governance mechanisms
in companies from family-based societies. Our findings support the appropriateness of separately
analyzing this issue in emerging countries.
Keywords: CSR reporting practices; Institutional Theory; corporate governance; BRICS
1. Introduction
Due to the large number of cases of negligence, corruption, and bad praxis uncovered over the
last 10 years and their significant impact from an economic, social, and environmental perspective,
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is receiving increasingly more attention from academics,
professionals, and society in general [1]. Inevitably, incidents of corporate fraud and scandals such
as the Volkswagen or Shell cases have promoted the idea that current corporate governance needs
to adopt an ethical, accountable, and socially responsible agenda in addition to dealing with agency
conflicts [2].
In this sense, what is happening in organizations is going to be known—particularly if it is not a
good practice—due to the power of social media. As a result, it falls to companies to decide whether
they want to have a proactive role in the reporting of this kind of information which goes further than
mandatory reporting [3].
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For several years, companies have been aware of the relevance of reporting their socially
responsible performance to stakeholders because this reduces informational asymmetries [4,5]
and increases transparency [6]. In order to accomplish this task through a report, firms have
mainly three options [7]: an integrated report (following International Integrated Reporting Council
recommendations); an annual report in which CSR information is included; or an independent
CSR/sustainability report. Although in recent years there has been growing interest in integrated
reports [8], most corporations communicate their CSR behaviors through a specific CSR/sustainability
report or include the CSR information in their annual report [9].
To be a successful, socially responsible enterprise, CSR actions must be correctly communicated
and have public visibility. For this reason, many scholars have emphasized the importance of these
reports being perceived as credible [10,11]. In order to enhance the quality of the reports, several steps
have been taken in two directions: the homogeneity of the reports (through international standards
such as Global Reporting Initiative–GRI-) and the verification of the information disclosed (assurance).
The previous literature identifies company size, profitability, industry, and financial performance
as determinants of CSR reporting [12–14]. More recently, studies have also highlighted the effect
that certain corporate governance (CG) mechanisms have on the existence and extension of CSR
reports [15,16]. The relationship between CG mechanisms and CSR reporting has progressively
attracted the interest of academics [17–19]. This suggests the appropriateness of going further into the
study of CG mechanisms as determinants of CSR reporting.
Most of these articles analyze this relationship from a one-level approach, although some
researchers [20] recommended studying this question from a multi-level approach in order to be
able to identify interdependences between multiple mechanisms. For these two authors, some of the
CG variables selected by researchers as determinants of social performance are often interrelated and
can have a compound effect despite belonging to different corporate levels (institutional, firm, group,
or individual levels).
This paper goes further in this line of research, though it is focused on a context which has received
less attention from academia [21]—emerging countries. Differences with other, more developed
environments [22] are expected due to: (1) the impact of the contextual and political factors on
CSR reporting strategies [23], particularly because there is less pressure from the public concerning
CSR disclosure in BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) [14], and (2) CG
mechanisms are less effective if a country’s governance system is not as strong as it should be [24].
Moreover, the roles of the board of directors’ members could differ when they are compared with
those of other, more developed countries [25].
Based on the information of CSR reports from the companies of emerging countries, the aim
of this study is to analyze how different levels of CG mechanisms affect companies’ CSR reporting
strategies in the context of emerging countries.
Considering these arguments, the study focuses on companies from BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa). Due to the data availability, the final sample is composed of
281 companies. Furthermore, this research is original in providing an analysis of corporate commitment
to CSR reporting across BRICS nations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the main theoretical
approaches identified in the literature on the CSR reporting field. Then, from the identification of
the determinants most used in previous research and considering the multi-level approach of CG
mechanisms, three hypotheses are formulated. In the following section, information about the method
and the sample is provided. Finally, the results are presented and some conclusions are drawn.
2. Determinants of CSR Reporting and Hypotheses Development
The literature focused on the analysis of the explanatory factors that affect CSR or sustainability
reporting has pointed out that company size [13], financial performance [26,27], industry [28], and
cultural environment [29] are determinants of CSR disclosure practices. In this sense, the pressures
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faced by companies as a consequence of the context in which they operate is revealed to be a key
variable which allows a better understanding of their CSR reporting practices. In fact, most researchers
recommend studying such variables by centering on a group of countries with similarities due to the
difficulty of isolating or controlling their effects [23,30].
Research on this topic has usually been focused on developed countries, although some recent
research has centered on emerging countries [14,19,22]. In this sense, most of the published research
works analyze whether these traditional determinants of CSR reporting practices are also a relevant
explanation in emerging countries. As a result, we highlight that there are not significant differences
in the impact of these traditional determinants (size, financial performance, industry, and cultural
environment) of CSR reporting practices between developed or developing countries. That is, in general,
larger and more profitable companies and those which operate in environmentally sensitive industries
show a greater commitment to non-financial disclosures, regardless of the cultural environment.
What is more, the role of regulation—the existence of a law that makes the adoption of certain
CSR reporting practices mandatory [31]—as well as the company’s level of internationalization are
presented as key variables for explaining the adoption of a CSR reporting practice, particularly in
emerging countries [32,33]. That is, regulation is usually a driver of CSR disclosure particularly in the
environment of emerging markets where this kind of practice is avoided by companies unless it is a
requirement (Baskin, 2006). Internationalization is presented as another pressure for the adoption of
CSR reporting practices. If companies want to operate globally, they need to meet the formal and the
informal requirements in all markets, and in the majority of developed countries’ markets CSR is no
longer optional.
In addition to the corporate features discussed above, the corporate governance–social responsibility
nexus has recently received a great deal of attention. In fact, it could be stated that the scope of CG has
broadened to encompass the growing importance of CSR [11]. Irrespective of the theoretical reasons,
most research reveals that CG mechanisms influence the nature and extent of CSR reporting [34,35].
Ntim and Soobaroyen [36] claimed that better governed corporations tend to pursue a more socially
responsible agenda through increased CSR practices.
In order to empirically support this relationship, several authors have analyzing how corporate
governance attributes are individually associated with different CSR reporting issues [19,22]. However,
Aguilera et al. [37] argued that CG variables are commonly examined separately according to the level
of analysis at which they operate. These are interdependent and interact with and affect both financial
and social outcomes in tandem. In this regard, Jain and Jamali [20] performed a literature review in
which they identified how different levels of CG mechanisms (institutional, firm, group, and individual)
impacted CSR. In the light of their findings, they encouraged scholars to “espouse a holistic approach
where mechanisms associated with different levels of CG are seen as interacting, i.e., substituting,
complementing, or overriding others, to form bundles and configurations of governance practices
that in turn influence CSR outcomes” (p. 266). This novel perspective for CG-CSR research, along
with the opportunity to elucidate CSR reporting in BRICS nations, leads us to propose our hypotheses,
considering the different theoretical arguments that support each relationship.
2.1. Institutional-Level CG Mechanisms
In order to show the relevance of the institutional environment in corporate reporting, we found
theoretical support in Institutional Theory [38–40], Stakeholders Theory [41,42], and Legitimacy
Theory [43]. According to Ali et al. [14], this last theoretical approach (Legitimacy Theory) is the
dominant theoretical lens in studies of companies from both developed and developing countries.
Companies are pressured by the environment in which they compete to adopt certain CSR
disclosure practices in order to be competitive in the market [29,44]. In addition to responding
to social pressures and contributing to their social legitimation, CSR reports are also essential to
satisfy institutional pressures [45]. Aguilera and Jackson [46] pointed out the special usefulness of
this approach to try to explain the way that corporate governments have to fulfill their functions.
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CSR disclosure is one manner of doing so. Pressures surrounding companies lead them to adopt
similar behaviors over time, since organizations recognize the characteristics of their legal, cultural,
and societal environment in order to conform to the prevalent rules, norms, and routines [38].
Luoma and Goodstein [47] emphasized the need to understand the institutional environment in
which firms operate for a better comprehension of firm strategies and managerial choices in relation
to CSR practices and engagement. Following this suggestion, some authors have shown how the
differences concerning CSR implementation and performance among organizations from different
institutional settings can be explained in terms of the differences in the rules, norms, values, routines,
and responsibilities expected [40]. Likewise, CG mechanisms are determined by the institutional
environment in which each company has developed its activities [19,30]. Jain and Jamali [20]
distinguished between formal and informal institutional mechanisms. According to their findings,
authors interested in the effect of these mechanisms should explore them together. While formal ones
comprise two important aspects for managerial discretion—the nature of the political and legal system
and the existence of CG regulations—the second type of mechanism refers to the norms, values, and
culture at the country level.
Chiu and Wang [48] identified the different roles of firms and stakeholders in each society as
a cornerstone for a better comprehension of the extent, issues, and quality of CSR reporting. Thus,
even when companies under study come from countries which share distinctive economical features,
the way in which they address and communicate their CSR actions could be subjected to effects of
different institutional environments and governance styles [49,50].
Consequently, our first hypothesis states:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Institutional-level CG mechanisms are determinants of the CSR disclosure practices in
BRICS countries.
2.2. Firm-Level CG Mechanisms
Ownership structure has been the most recurrent CG mechanism examined as a determinant of
CSR reporting at the firm level, especially in developed countries [22,51–53]. Most research conducted
so far has considered CSR reporting to be an additional component associated with voluntary corporate
disclosure. Precisely, its novel and non-compulsory character has been responsible from its origins
for potential conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. In accordance with Agency
Theory assumptions, it is supposed that the main shareholders have both greater power and incentives
to monitor management, as their wealth is tied to the firm’s financial performance [54]. Regarding
the number of shareholders, opportunistic management behavior and conflicts of interests between
the principal and the agent are normally associated with high dispersion ownership [26,55]. When
ownership is dispersed across many investors, there is increased pressure on managers and they are
expected to disclose more information in order to gain legitimacy and reduce the agency costs of
monitoring activities [50,56]. From this perspective, corporate disclosures become a helpful tool to
improve the monitoring function in companies with dispersed ownership [36].
Under the Agency Theory perspective, Jain and Jamali [20] argued that concentrated owners are
prone to stall any CSR investment employed by managers for entrenchment purposes. Furthermore,
as the main shareholders are able to obtain the company’s information through internal communication
mechanisms, they are less willing to publicly expose their own company’s performance [57]. However,
as an exception, Jain and Jamali [20] also suggested that following a stakeholder logic, the substantial
shareholders could support managers’ decisions on CSR issues because of their long-term positive
effect on corporate competitiveness and firm value [58]. In this line, Prado-Lorenzo et al. [59] associated
firm reputation with the dominant shareholder’s personal reputation and they concluded that when a
dominant shareholder is interested in the company’s long-term survival as well as in maintaining his
or her own personal reputation, the firm will be more likely to adopt decisions aimed at improving its
economic, social, and environmental performance.
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Ownership structure influences CSR disclosure in developing countries [60], although the
empirical evidence is scarce, mostly due to the lack of data available to carry out this research.
Most of this evidence is focused on relation-based countries and the results report differences in the
sign of the effect depending on the kind of ownership structure analyzed (i.e., family ownership [61]
and managerial ownership [18], among others). Ownership concentration was analyzed in Chinese
companies [62,63] and the findings were contrary to these results. While the former found that
companies with a more concentrated ownership have more CSR disclosure, the latter suggested that
the extent of CSR reporting is negatively influenced by ownership concentration. Evidence from
other developing countries is also inconclusive (a positive effect in Malaysia [53]; a negative effect in
Bangladesh [22]).
Our second hypothesis states:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Firm-level CG mechanisms are determinants of the CSR disclosure practices in
BRICS countries.
2.3. Group-Level CG Mechanisms
CG encompasses the process aimed at setting global objectives and monitoring their
achievement [64]. Boards of directors are one of the available structural elements for ensuring the
success of this process. These directors are the last in charge of a business’ operating efficiency and their
decisions are made considering the point of view of competitiveness, including that related to CSR
issues [65]. The literature shows that CG structures have been associated with voluntary disclosures,
including CSR information [34,51,66].
As Jain and Jamali [20] asserted, boards represent mechanisms for monitoring managers to avoid
agency conflicts, but also allow companies to consider multiple stakeholder interests in the process
of managerial decision-making. Hence, boards’ behaviors when CSR reporting is under study is
explained from two approaches: Agency Theory (supervisory function), and Stakeholder Theory
(managerial function). In addition, good management arguments [67,68] also contribute to justifying
why CG mechanisms at the group level can affect CSR disclosure decisions. In this sense, this last
theoretical approach suggests that more effective boards are those which make the best decisions—in
this case CSR disclosure—looking for an increase of financial performance.
Two CG mechanisms have normally been considered for assessing both the effectiveness in board
decisions related to CSR reporting and the monitoring capability of boards: board size and board
independence [69].
Board size has been considered as a crucial aspect of CG. However, its effect on CSR disclosure
is controversial [70]. In accordance with Stakeholder Theory, large corporate boards could be
representative of diverse interests [71]. From another point of view, Jensen [72] emphasized that
a board with more directors is less likely to function effectively due to coordination, communication, or
free-rider problems. Some authors have argued that the impact of board size depends on the efficiency
of the decision-making process [5]. In this regard, Coles et al. [73] showed that larger boards are able
to monitor business operations better than smaller ones, but they also indicated that when boards are
too large the monitoring process becomes ineffective. Consequently, Mahmood et al. [74] suggested
that there is not an ideal board size for all companies.
Empirical evidence on the influence of board size on the CSR reporting practices of companies
from BRICS nations is very scarce. Ntim and Soobaroyen [36] identified a weak and positive
association for non-financial firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Focusing on Chinese
companies, References [75–77] reported that board size had a positive influence on CSR reporting.
In another study concerning the effect of CG structure and strategic CSR on sustainability reporting
quality in companies from the Asian-Pacific region, Amran et al. [11] showed an insignificant
relationship. Empirical evidence from other developing countries supported a positive association
(Pakistan [74,78,79], Sri Lanka [80], Malaysia [51–53,81,82]) or revealed the lack of a statistically
significant effect (Turkey [83,84]).
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Board independence is another aspect of CG that is frequently studied for its relevance.
For Li et al. [50], one of the board’s main roles is the monitoring of managers’ activity on behalf
of owners. According to this aim, this role could be developed by incorporating outside directors, since
they are under less pressure from shareholders and managers than internal ones [69] and they usually
have a greater expertise [57,59]. Thus, from Agency Theory, the literature suggests that increasing
independent directors contributes to mitigating agency costs and improving the quality of board
monitoring [54,55].
Consequently, the higher presence of directors who are less aligned to management usually
encourages companies to engage in corporate voluntary disclosure in general, and in CSR disclosures
in particular [85]. Likewise, it is suggested that a higher proportion of independent directors (1) usually
translates into a greater transparency commitment and this, in turn, has a positive effect on the
long-term firm value [86]; (2) not only ensures that companies are properly monitored and managed,
but also contributes to enhancing corporate image [87].
In general, though most authors usually hypothesize a positive association between board
independency and CSR disclosures, the empirical evidence is mixed. Again, few studies have focused
on BRICS nations, either as a whole or separately. Among studies which found positive evidence are
those conducted on a sample of companies from BRICS nations [50], on Chinese firms [62], on South
African listed firms [36], and on Indian publicly listed companies [88]. Recently, Liu and Zhang [75]
and Liao et al. [76] did not note that the proportion of independent directors in Chinese companies was
a determinant variable in order to explain CSR disclosures. Nor did Amran et al. [11] find evidence in
a sample with companies from the Asian-Pacific region. Looking at empirical evidence of firms from
different developing countries, there is not a clear relationship—both positive results (Pakistan [74,79],
Bangladesh [22], Turkey [83,84]) and non-significant effects (Sri Lanka [80], Pakistan [78]) have been
found. The case of Malaysia is special since there are prior studies concluding that there is a positive
link [53], a negative link [80], and studies which did not find a significant relation [51,52,82].
Considering the lack of consensus of prior evidence and the extant gap with respect to BRICS
nations, our third hypothesis states:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Group-level CG mechanisms are determinants of the CSR disclosure practices in
BRICS countries.
3. Data Sources and Methodology
3.1. Sample
Our research is focused on BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)
because they are recognized internationally as the five emerging markets with the greatest potential
to influence global economic and political spheres. Thus, the selection of companies from these
BRICS countries is motivated by (i) the relevance of these emerging markets in the international
economic environment; (ii) the particular way in which these countries have faced the recent financial
crisis; (iii) the little attention paid to CSR disclosure in developing countries, and (iv) the existence of
differences in CSR reporting strategies in their companies as well as their use of CG mechanisms when
compared with those in a more developed context.
The sample used is composed of listed companies located in BRICS countries, whose CG and
financial data were available in the ASSET4 Thomson Reuters database and whose CSR reports could
be read. After performing this two-step selection process, the final sample included 281 companies as
a representation of each country’s best companies.
Then, the CSR disclosure practices carried out by each company was analyzed based on the
information of their CSR/sustainability reports, their annual financial statements, and their integrated
reports. Except for a few companies, most of these documents were directly downloaded from the
Global Reporting Initiative website Considering the “disclosure precedent” argument [89] (which
argues that firms have to maintain the same pattern of reporting because stakeholders´ expectations
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depend on previous reporting), it is not necessary to contemplate a sequence of reports. Finally, in
order to ensure the comparability of the reports considered, our sample is composed of the reports
corresponding to the financial year 2012. A new version of GRI guidelines (4.0) was launched in
May 2013. This new version implied changes in the content as well as in the level of adoption of the
guidelines since there was no longer levels A, B, or C. Companies had until the end of 2015 to adopt
this new version (GRI 4.0), but some of them continued with the GRI 3.1 version while others decided
to adopt the GRI 4.0. This meant that from 2013 until 2016, there was not a unique version of the
guidelines and thus the comparability of companies decreases.
3.2. Variables
Table 1 presents the information and references about how each dependent, independent, and
control variable is measured.
3.2.1. Dependent Variables: CSR Reporting Practices
“CSR reporting complexity” is used as a dependent variable to evaluate the level of commitment
assumed by each company concerning the disclosure of their social and environmental behaviors.
This was elaborated following the index of Moneva et al. [90] based on the aggregation of four items
(dummy variables). Consistent with Muñoz et al. [91], every firm is classified depending on the
score obtained on the complexity of its CSR report as “opaque” (0 points), “pro-translucid” (1 point),
“translucid” (2 points), “pro-transparent” (3 points), and “transparent” (4 points).
Table 1. Dependent, independent, and control variables.
Variables Measures
Dependent
variable
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting complexity [90]
Index formed by:
CSR information in a report
GRI adoption
Getting a GRI “in accordance” level
Assurance of the CSR report
GRI levels [16]
0—non-GRI application level
1—GRI level C
2—GRI level B
3—GRI level A
Independent
variables
Group-level corporate governance
(CG) mechanisms
Board size [76] Number of directors
Independent directors [88] % of independent directors
Firm-level CG mechanisms Reference shareholder * Dummy variable [26,59]
Institutional-level CG mechanism GEI [92,93]: rule-based, family-basedor relation-based
Control
variables
Organizational characteristics
Size Total assets [11,51]
Profitability ROA [16,35]
International sales Dummy variable [32]
CSR committee Dummy variable [11,15]
Mandatory Dummy variable [94]: 0 (Voluntary),1 (Mandatory) **
Industry sensitivity [95] ASSET 4
* If the company is owned by a reference shareholder who has the majority of the voting rights, veto power or
golden share; ** this is considered if there was any policy and regulation for sustainability and CSR reporting in
2012 regarding the listed companies. In our case, this was mandatory in Brazil, China, and South Africa. GEI:
Governance Environment Index; ROA: Return on Assets.
Nevertheless, this CSR Index does not reflect the different GRI application levels. Therefore,
another variable, “GRI level”, was designed based on Rodríguez-Ariza et al. [16] to assess the scope of
the CSR disclosure carried out by firms according to the GRI standards.
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3.2.2. Corporate Governance Mechanism: Group, Firm, and Institutional Levels
As discussed before, we focused our study on the group, firm, and institutional levels of CG
mechanisms pointed out by Jain and Jamali [20]. Considering previous evidence in the field of CSR
reporting, we selected the specific indicators for each kind of measure (see Table 1).
The board of directors has to make decisions, and a way to assure that these decisions have
been taken considering all the perspectives comes as a result of an optimal composition. Between
the different options to measure the group-level CG mechanisms, we focused on the efficacy of
the composition of the boards of directors, and specifically on board size and the independence of
directors because the previous literature has pointed these factors out as being the most determinant
CG mechanisms.
One of the main roles of the board of directors is to solve potential conflicts of interest between
shareholders and managers. Consequently, the presence of a reference shareholder is one of the
most relevant characteristics of ownership which is undoubtedly going to have an influence on the
company’s strategic decisions [26]. Hence, it is the measure used for the firm-level CG mechanism. As a
measure of institutional CG mechanisms, we used the Governance Environment Index (GEI) developed
by Li and Filer [96]. This index considers five relevant aspects of each environment: political rights,
rule of law, free press, the quality of accounting standards, and general trust levels. The procedure for
obtaining GEI data is explained in detail in Li and Filer [96] This index shows the degree to which a
society relies on a certain type of governance mechanism to govern social exchanges. In other words,
it is an aggregate measure encompassing different institutional factors related to the political, legal,
economic, and cultural aspects of the environment in which a company operates. According to the sign
of this index [92], a society could be rule-based (if it received a positive GEI score), or non-rule-based
(if it received a negative score). In order to make a distinction between those societies classified as
non-rule-based, a cluster analysis was carried out by the introduction of trust variables. As a result,
family-based and relation-based societies were differentiated [93]. Table 2 shows the GEI scores and
their classification.
Table 2. GEI scores and classification of countries involved in the study.
Relation-Based Family-Based Rule-Based
China −5.92
Russia −4.34
South
Africa
3.11Brazil −2.06
India −0.85
Source: References [92,93].
3.2.3. Control Variables
Moreover, we included several control variables related to company characteristics, such
as size [88,97], profitability [35,77,98], regulation [31], internationalization [32,33], and industry
sensitivity [99] based on the previous literature.
Additionally, the existence of a CSR committee [34,56,74] at the board level is a clear indication
of the company’s CSR engagement. Since one of this committee’s functions is to ensure the quality
of company sustainability disclosure, the existence of a CSR committee can be viewed as a sign of its
commitment to the stakeholders [11,15].
3.3. Regression Model Proposed
In accordance with the objectives proposed, we used ordinal regression models instead of
other more complex statistical models due to (1) the low number of hypotheses and (2) the lack
of variables that require more than one measure to be evaluated. In addition, multiple linear regression
models have been frequently used to investigate the link between explanatory variables and CSR
reporting [11,26,30,70]. We used Stata, version 12.0 for statistics. In order to consider whether
Sustainability 2019, 11, 61 9 of 20
institutional CG mechanisms significantly influence firm and group-level CG mechanisms, this variable
helped us to break up the sample into three subsamples (relation-based, family-based, and rule-based).
So, the proposed model is (see Figure 1):
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4. Results and Discussion
From Tables 3 and 4, the composition of the sample can be seen: 32.03% from South Africa,
27.05% from India, 16.73% from China, 15.65% from Brazil, and 8.54% from Russia. That is, the most
represented country is South Africa and the least is Russia.
Table 3. Descriptive analysis (mean values) of the sample focused on the quantitative information.
Complete Sample
N = 281
Brazil
N = 44
China
N = 47
India
N = 76
Russia
N = 24
South Africa
N = 90
Total assets (millions) 592.520 57.301 1066.461 724.523 2196.530 67.473
ROA 7.878 6.352 3.846 9.638 6.134 9.709
International sales (millions) 68.183 3.380 24.025 112.762 353.637 9.157
Board size 10.94 9.02 11.08 10.89 11.16 11.76
Independent directors (%) 37.612 22.47 24.90 44.75 37.46 45.65
Estimated data based on the information from ASSET4.
The descriptive analysis of the complete sample presents an overview of the firms analyzed and
there are significant differences in the characteristics of the companies between countries. The larger
size and the higher amount of international sales of Russian companies should, then, be pointed out.
On the other hand, Brazilian and South African companies are revealed as the smallest in the sample
considered. The most profitable companies are those from South Africa and India.
In relation to the size of the board of directors, the board does not present any significant variation
among the countries. Most organizations have around 11 directors, except for Brazilian firms whose
boards are smaller (around nine directors).
South African and Indian firms are characterized as having the largest percentage of independent
members on their boards (around 45% of the directors are independent), while this percentage is
smaller for Brazilian and Chinese companies (less than 25%). This result disagrees with the corporate
governance recommendations made by the Brazilian Code of Governance in 2009, which suggest that
most directors should be independent. Nevertheless, our results are in accordance with the report by
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Li et al. [50] concerning the association between board independence and the GEI level of companies
in more rule-based environments, which usually have more independent boards.
Table 4. Descriptive analysis of the sample focused on the qualitative information.
Complete Sample
N = 281
Brazil
N = 44
China
N = 47
India
N = 76
Russia
N = 24
South Africa
N = 90
Complexity of the CSR reporting
Opaque
Pro-translucid
Translucid
Pro-transparent
Transparent
18.1%
45.2%
7.8%
13.2%
15.7%
20.5%
11.4%
11.4%
22.7%
34.1%
27.7%
63.8%
4.3%
0%
4.3%
22.4%
47.4%
1.3%
6.6%
22.3%
33.3%
20.9%
12.5%
33.3%
0%
4.4%
56.7%
12.2%
15.6%
11.1%
GRI level
A
B
C
Non-GRI
16.0%
13.2%
6.0%
64.8%
29.5%
25%
13.6%
31.8%
2.1%
2.1%
0%
95.8%
27.6%
1.3%
0%
71.1%
16.6%
25%
4.2%
54.2%
6.7%
20%
11.1%
62.2%
Reference shareholder (%) 0.36 0.50 0.43 0.37 0.70 0.44
CSR committee (%) 0.61 0.75 0.30 0.47 0.33 0.88
Estimated data based on the information from ASSET4.
In addition, the greater number of companies in which there is a reference shareholder is also
reported for companies located in Russia and Brazil. It should be highlighted that 36% of the companies
of the samples have a reference shareholder. As we considered this data as a representation of the
ownership concentration, we deduce that a majority of the companies included in the sample have
a non-concentrated ownership. Likewise, 61% of the companies included in the sample have a CSR
committee. Nevertheless, this percentage is significantly lower for companies from China and Russia.
As to the dependent variable, it is important to highlight the lack of engagement with CSR
disclosure shown by around 18% of the companies analyzed (51 of the 281). These findings support a
positive association between the governance environment index and the companies’ engagement with
CSR reporting. Thus, companies from rule-based societies are more committed to CSR information
disclosure and are less “opaque” [50], although it should be considered that companies in the rule-based
country included in the sample have to mandatorily report. In this sense, Loprevite et al. [100] asserted
that the introduction of mandatory regulations has a significant positive effect on corporate reporting,
although not all researchers agree with this [101,102].
It is relevant to point out the low percentage of opaque firms in South Africa, with only 4% (four
out of 90). Conversely, Russia and China have the highest percentages of opaque firms, with 33.3% and
27.7%, respectively. Despite policies and regulations related to sustainability development in China,
the low commitment of companies has been noted previously by other authors and most of them
agree that CSR reporting is in its beginnings in China [36,49,77]. Likewise, the engagement of Russian
companies contrasts with the behavior of other European companies which have to face significant
transparency requirements. Despite the fact that 18.1% of companies do not report about CSR, the
percentage of companies committed to CSR reporting is higher than the world mean value (according
to Reference [9], this is 71% for N100) and lower than the mean value for developed countries.
Regarding transparency, 28.9% of the firms included in the sample are classified as pro-transparent
or transparent. Brazil is the country which presents a higher number of companies classified as
transparent, followed by India, which is consistent with the findings of Arrive and Feng [31].
On the other hand, considering only those companies that publish some kind of report (81.9%; 230
out of the 281 companies in the sample), it was observed that those which prepare the report following
the GRI guidelines were less (99) than those which did not follow this standard (131). This result
suggests that the GRI standards are not used as much by companies in BRICS countries as in developed
countries since, according to KMPG [103] in 2013, they are used in 74% of the CSR reports around
the world.
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Among the studied companies, there is a relevant difference concerning the use or non-use
of the GRI guidelines. In particular, while 85.7% of Brazilian companies which published a CSR
report (30 of 35) used this standard as a reference and achieved an A, B, or C level, only 5.6% of
Chinese firms disclosing CSR information preferred to follow the GRI guidelines (two out of 34).
Interestingly, after Brazilian corporations, firms from Russia showed a higher tendency to follow the
GRI recommendations—68.75% of the 16 firms which published a report. Taking into account the
companies which did so, the percentages of firms from Brazil and India that achieved an A adoption
level are the highest. The case of Indian companies is particularly interesting since those which decided
to adopt the GRI recommendations did this comprehensively and almost all of them achieved an
A level.
Regarding the bivariate correlations reported in Table 5, it is highlighted that both CSR disclosure
measures considered are highly correlated. Moreover, board size, the existence of a CSR committee,
and the presence of a reference shareholder show a positive correlation with both CSR disclosure
measures. Between the different levels of CG mechanisms, it necessary to point out that institutional CG
mechanisms present a high correlation with group- and firm-level CG measures. This fact prompted
our not being able to include this variable in our regressions due to collinearity problems. However,
in order to test its effect, we used it to divide the sample.
Table 5. Bivariate correlations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) Reporting complexity 1
(2) GRI level 0.89 ** 1
(3) Board size 0.17 ** 0.13 * 1
(4) Board independence 0.02 0.04 0.01 1
(5) CSR committee 0.46 ** 0.38 ** 0.22 ** 0.05 1
(6) Reference Shareholder 0.13 * 0.15 * −0.02 −0.24 ** −0.06 1
(7) Mandatory 0.04 −0.06 −0.01 −0.20 ** 0.26 ** −0.15 * 1
(8) Institutional CG
mechanism −0.05 −0.17 ** 0.21 ** 0.17 ** 0.29 ** −0.29 ** 0.67 ** 1
(9) Size 0.03 0.02 0.25 ** −0.07 0.010 0.14 * −0.19 ** −0.15 * 1
(10) Profitability 0.14 * 0.09 −0.05 0.12 0.04 −0.04 −0.09 0.08 −0.13 * 1
(11) Internationalization 0.15 * 0.12 * 0.18 ** 0.16 ** 0.08 −0.01 0.04 0.21 ** 0.05 −0.04 1
Significance test ** <0.01, * <0.05.
Additionally, board independence presents a negative correlation with the existence of a reference
shareholder, which means “the higher the ownership concentration, the less the percentage of
independent directors on the board”. In contrast to the results of Chen and Jaggi [85] result, board
independence also shows a significant negative correlation with the existence of CSR regulations.
This finding could be explained by the higher emphasis placed on CSR regulations in those countries
where the recommendations about the proportion of independent board directors are not implemented.
Moreover, the results reveal that there is a higher probability of companies with larger boards having
CSR committees.
The results from the statistical tests of the regressions carried out are presented in Tables 6 and 7.
The analysis of the results related to CSR reporting complexity (Table 6) show that the explanatory
power varies between 18% (for the rule-based subsample) and 50% (for the family-based subsample).
These R squared coefficients are not so high (particularly in the case of the rule-based subsample),
but most of them are greater than the coefficients reported in the previous literature on this topic in
emerging countries [27,51,75,76].
Firm-level CG mechanisms (particularly ownership concentration) have no significant statistical
effect on CSR reporting complexity for each subsample considered. In this line, most previous evidence
in the context of emerging countries is focused on relation-based societies and the results are not
conclusive since some indicate that companies with a less concentrated ownership are those with a
more extensive CSR disclosure [22,63], while others note the contrary [53,62].
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Table 6. Determinants of CSR reporting complexity.
Complete Sample Family-Based(N = 144)
Relation-Based
(N = 47)
Rule-Based
(N = 90)
Constant −4.894 *** −4.883 *** −6.062 *** −5.744 *** −2.773 * −2.941 * −2.138 −2.181
Board size 0.029 - 0.067 † - -0.019 - 0.006 -
Board independ. 0.002 - 0.003 - -0.023 * - 0.003 -
Ref. shareholder - 0.107 - 0.006 - 0.217 - −0.042
Size 0.240 *** 0.254 *** 0.262 *** 0.287 *** 0.223 *** 0.187 * 0.170 0.186 *
Profitability 0.043 *** 0.042 *** 0.060 *** 0.061 *** 0.025 0.020 0.016 0.015
Internationalization 0.462 *** 0.481 *** 0.443 * 0.496 * 0.308 0.283 0.666 * 0.682 *
Industry
sensitivity 0.191 0.164 0.413 * 0.401 * −0.374
† −0.379 † −0.561 −0.563
CSR committee 0.977 *** 0.999 *** 1.235 *** 1.293 *** 0.341 0.371 0.249 0.243
Mandatory 1.742 *** 1.722 *** 1.767 *** 1.644 *** - - - -
Country
(controlled) *** *** - - - - - -
R2 0.393 0.391 0.500 0.488 0.433 0.382 0.180 0.177
Significance test *** <0.005, * <0.05, † <0.1.
Table 7. Determinants of GRI level.
Complete Sample Family-Based(N = 144)
Relation-Based
(N = 47)
Rule-Based
(N = 90)
Constant −4.097 *** −4.181 *** −5.749 *** −5.625 *** −1.557 −1.255 −3.530* −3.241
†
Board size 0.023 - 0.072 † - -0.016 - −0.026 -
Board independ. 0.004 - 0.007 - -0.005 - 0.001 -
Ref. shareholder - −0.048 - −0.212 - 0.231 - 0.007
Size 0.187 *** 0.211 *** 0.219 ** 0.267 *** 0.100 † 0.064 0.223 † 0.192 †
Profitability 0.037 *** 0.038 *** 0.047 *** 0.050 *** 0.013 0.011 0.023 0.022
Internationalization 0.421 *** 0.447 *** 0.320 † 0.389 * 0.177 0.187 0.781 * 0.781 *
Industry
sensitivity 0.354 * 0.348 * 0.548** 0.574 *** −0.180 −0.217 −0.178 −0.162
CSR committee 0.662 *** 0.671 *** 0.850 *** 0.904 *** −0.070 −0.047 0.242 0.200
Mandatory 1.460 *** 1.438 *** 1.815 *** 1.712 *** - - - -
Country
(controlled) *** *** - - - - - -
R2 0.342 0.338 0.434 0.419 0.144 0.177 0.159 0.156
Significance test *** <0.005, * <0.05, † <0.1.
Nevertheless, group-level CG mechanisms are revealed as determinants of CSR reporting
complexity for companies in relation-based and family-based countries. Yet, it should be pointed out
that the concrete mechanisms which affect CSR reporting complexity vary. In the case of firms from
family-based environments, the strategy of reporting will be more complex for those companies with
larger boards. The curvilinear relationship has been tested, but the results suggest that there is a linear
relationship for all subsamples. These results represent a contribution to the lack of previous empirical
evidence in family-based environments. This scarcity could be explained by the limited availability of
data in some countries (i.e., Russia) and the absence of results for each individual country included in
cross-cultural studies (i.e., Brazil). Nevertheless, research focused on other family-based environments,
such as Turkey [83,84], has suggested that board size has no influence on CSR reporting practices.
However, the higher the percentage of independent members, the lower the complexity of the
CSR reporting practices in organizations from a relation-based environment. Previous evidence
in this regard shows no significant [75,76] or positive effect [62] in Chinese companies, although
Esa and Ghazali [81] found a negative impact in Malaysian companies, which also belong to a
relation-based environment.
Any firm- or group-level CG mechanism has a statistically significant effect on the complexity
of CSR disclosure practices for companies in rule-based countries. One of the main reasons behind
this behavior is related to the fact that companies of the country analyzed (South Africa) have to
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mandatorily report on social and environmental issues. This greatly conditions the CSR disclosure
practices carried out.
From the study of the GRI level (Table 7), the loss of predictive power in almost all cases except
for the rule-based environment must be pointed out, due to the differences found in the degree of
adoption in each country. This effect is higher in case of a relation-based environment, which is
explained by the low number of companies that prepare their reports following the GRI guidelines
(see Table 4). Some institutional environments show a statistically significant effect of firm-level
CG mechanisms; however, for family-based environments, group-level CG mechanisms present a
positive influence of the adoption of a higher GRI level (in particular, board size). As is seen in Table 7,
practically no variable included in our study is a determinant of achieving a GRI level in companies
from relation-based societies. Only company size and internationalization are determinants of this
adoption in rule-based firms.
The existence of a CSR committee has a positive significant effect on both CSR reporting practices
in the complete sample as well as in firms from family-based societies. As was discussed by
Adnan et al. [19], the existence of a committee in charge of sustainability issues shows that this
company is concerned about its socially and environmentally friendly actions. However, no significant
impact is reported in companies from relation and rule-based environments. Although the reasons
that could explain these results seem to be very contradictory (see the difference in the percentage of
companies from each country that have a CSR committee), it is necessary to point out that reporting
is mandatory in countries involved in the two GEI considered. There is a lack of previous empirical
evidence in this respect since most research in countries in which CSR reporting is mandatory does not
include this variable in its analyses. If companies have to report about CSR issues, the existence of
this committee seems to have no impact on the complexity of their CSR disclosure policies or on the
adoption of GRI standards.
Company size shows a significant impact on the CSR report’s level of complexity as well as on
the degree of GRI adoption, even though the level varies depending on the institutional environment
considered. Consistent with Chatterjee and Mir [97], the larger the company, the more visible its
stakeholders and the higher the expectations for bearing the costs resulting from their political or
lobbying actions. Thus, it is reasonable for bigger firms to find more advantages in CSR reporting than
smaller ones. Nevertheless, profitability does not always present a significant impact, but rather only
if the complete sample or family-based subsample is considered. This evidence is not in line with the
results of Kansal et al. [27]. They found no statistically significant effect in Indian companies. In this
sense, one of the main reasons behind this lack of a significant effect could be linked to the existence of
mandatory reporting.
Contrary to assumptions made under Legitimacy Theory [104], but consistent with the results
of Chan and Welford [105], relation-based countries show an inverse and significant relationship
between CSR reporting and the industry’s exposure to environment-related risks. In firms belonging to
rule-based countries, international activity is reported as a unique variable which significantly affects
the CSR reporting complexity.
The differences found concerning the significant determinants of CSR reporting among companies
from a family-based environment or not lead us to take an opposite point of view from Reverte [26],
who argued that the limited effect of the institutional environment on CSR strategies is a consequence
of increasingly globalized stock markets.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the goodness-of-fit coefficients in the case of rule-based
environments for both models (the CSR reporting complexity and the GRI level) are lower than those
for the rest of the institutional environments. This is explained by the fact that the regulation in South
Africa obliges companies to report following the integrated reporting framework.
If the results obtained from this research are compared with the empirical evidence in developed
countries, we highlight that most evidence suggests a positive impact of the existence of a reference
shareholder on specific CSR reporting practices (assurance [18], GRI [59]). That means that he/she
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is identified with the company and in a long-term relationship, so this encourages transparency and
accountability. As to the group-level CG measures, we underscore that most CSR reporting practices
are positively influenced by board size [15,16,18,106], although some authors have pointed out the
existence of a U-shaped relationship [17]. Regarding the presence of independent directors, most of
the literature has suggested a non-significant impact of this variable [70], although some research has
presented a positive influence [69,86].
5. Conclusions
The aim of this research was to analyze how different levels of CG mechanisms affect companies’
CSR reporting strategies in the context of emerging countries, since previous evidence suggests
differences in these companies as compared to those in developed countries. There has been scarce
empirical research on this topic, mainly due to the lack of data availability.
The research conducted shows how institutional differences among BRICS nations should be
taken into account when an exhaustive analysis of CSR reporting determinants is carried out. In this
sense, our outcomes show the effect of cultural and social settings on CSR reporting and shed light
on the relevance of promoting the social and environmental awareness mechanisms surrounding
companies in addition to developing CSR policies focused on corporations. Also, the influence of
the institutional CG mechanism confirms the argument that the normative and cultural peculiarities
of each environment require different analyses and answers. The divergences identified could be a
response adapted to the cultural and normative environments, even among countries that a priori
share certain economic features. In fact, this variable moderates the effect of most of the corporate
characteristics and contextual and internal factors analyzed. Considering all these arguments, the main
contribution of our research is to add more evidence to the Institutional Theory framework in the CSR
reporting field.
Our findings suggest that future research in the area should consider the suitability of using
measures of CSR disclosure not based exclusively on the level of adoption of GRI standards. This will
be particularly relevant in future research focused on companies located in countries where such
standards are not the main option guiding CSR reports, and further investigation should be carried
out on this particular topic.
This last argument remarks again the need to establish appropriate legal mechanisms to ensure
minimum commitments in transparency. In this sense, it has been observed that for those companies
in family-based environments, the existence of legal imperatives of reporting about CSR issues has
a positive impact on the adoption of more complex CSR reporting practices. This contributes to the
debate about whether CSR reports should be regulated or not. It provides evidence that the regulation
concerning CSR reporting does not always imply that companies only comply with what is legally
established, since they at times go further in the adoption of more complex practices.
It must be pointed out that our findings support the appropriateness of separately studying the
effect of CG mechanisms on CSR disclosure practices in developing countries since they are different
from those achieved by research focused on developed countries. The first difference is found in most
developed countries being included in the category of rule-based societies, and most of them reported
on a voluntary basis in the period analyzed. Considering this, most research on the topic based on
companies from developed countries could not analyze the institutional level of CG mechanisms.
The second difference is due to the non-significant effect of the firm-level CG mechanisms
presented in this research. In this sense, previous evidence in developed countries suggests that firms
with a more concentrated ownership will have more complex CSR reporting strategies. The third
difference concerns group-level CG mechanisms. Empirical evidence in developed countries concludes
that the presence of independent directors and board size have a positive influence on the CSR
reporting strategy, as long as the boards are effective. Nevertheless, our results suggest that only board
size has an impact on CSR reporting practices in relation-based countries.
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Our research also shows that determinant factors of voluntary CSR reporting are not explicative
when the reporting is done on a mandatory basis. Considering the increasing regulation in several
countries, future research should consider these results and more thoroughly analyze the case of each
law; that is, identify which CSR reporting practices are mandatory in each country. Once this has been
analyzed, the next step may be to go further into the analysis of the determinants of more complex
CSR reporting practices in countries in which companies have to mandatorily report.
Our findings could be extrapolated to those companies from emerging countries which are close in
their institutional environment, particularly those from family-based or relation-based environments,
as well as close in the level of development to those included in our sample. However, the evidence
from this research is not generalizable to developing or developed countries since the degree of
engagement with CSR reporting practices analyzed significantly differs (especially for GRI adoption),
and due to the fact that CG mechanisms are not equally effective and developed in the particular
environment analyzed. In this regard, it is clear that further research in the field on mandatory CSR
reporting should be conducted, since it seems that most countries are adopting this kind of policy
despite the limitations pointed out by several researchers.
In addition, due to the sample composition, the companies analyzed are those that are the most
transparent of each country, so the results should be interpreted considering that they do not reflect
the complete reality of these countries. In addition, some limitations exist due to the lack of data
availability at the time of study, which led to only two measures of group-level and one measure of
firm-level CG mechanisms being included in the empirical analysis. In this sense, further research on
this topic is recommended, considering the environment of developing countries, that analyzes other
kinds of firm-level CG mechanisms such as family, managerial, or institutional ownership in order to
see if there are also differences with respect to developed countries.
As another limitation, we need to mention that the CSR reporting practices of each company were
assessed by their respective CSR/sustainability reports, although firms can also disclose this kind of
information through their website, press releases, or social networks. Future research may consider
disclosure practices in a broader way to allow a more complete analysis of these practices.
Finally, we would like to point out that further research should develop an equivalent index of CSR
reporting complexity that allows the reflection the changes in the GRI guidelines (i.e., “in accordance”
core or comprehensive levels), as well as other novelties in the field of CSR reporting.
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